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Distributive justice deals with allocations of goods and bads within a group. Different prin-
ciples and results of distributions are seen as possible ideals. Often those normative approa-
ches are solely framed verbally, which complicates the application to different concrete dis-
tribution situations that are supposed to be evaluated in regard to justice. One possibility in 
order to frame this precisely and to allow for a fine-grained evaluation of justice lies in for-
mal modelling of these ideals by metrics. Choosing a metric that is supposed to map a 
certain ideal has to be justified. Such justification might be given by demanding specific 
substantiated axioms, which have to be met by a metric. This paper introduces such axioms 
for metrics of distributive justice shown by the example of needs-based justice. Furthermore, 
some exemplary metrics of needs-based justice and a three dimensional method for visuali-
sation of non-comparative justice axioms or evaluations are presented. Therewith, a base 
worth discussing for the evaluation and modelling of metrics of distributive justice is given. 
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Introduction1 
Issues of distributive justice are omnipresent. Economics and politics as well as medicine 
or private citizens are faced by them. The difficulty of how to distribute a given good or 
bad has troubled thinkers for generations and led them to many very distinct normative 
theories. As a general rule those theories have in common that everybody should get a 
person’s due. Disagreement seems to be centred upon how to legitimize such a person’s 
due. Amongst other criteria in the debate are equality, equity, power and desert. Another 
criterion considered to be possible is that of need (cf. Forsyth, 2006). 
Besides this problem of disagreement that encompasses the whole historic discourse, the-
re is a certain inaccuracy that can be discussed: Thus far being generally formulated only 
verbally, it is not always clear how the different ideals of justice should be applied to diffe-
rent concrete distribution situations that are supposed to be evaluated in regard to justice. 
Often it is not possible to state which impact small variations in distributions are suppo-
sed to have on their justice evaluation. 
                                                          
 
 
1 For their helpful remarks, comments and discussions I would like to thank inter alia Andrew Lawrence Fassett, Jakob Ko-
scholke, Michael Schippers, Sunke Schlüters, Mark Siebel, Nils Springhorn, Stefan Traub, Malte Maria Unverzagt, Hanna 
Marthe Vasen and Arne Robert Weiß, as well as Svenja Mareike Bedenlier and Vanessa Barbagiovanni Bugiacca for their 
helpful commitment during the publishing process of this paper. 
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This inaccuracy might be dissolved if the ideals in question are modelled formally by met-
rics of distributive justice and thereby gaining precise mathematical auxiliaries that can 
achieve the evaluation of different distributive situations with regard to their distributive 
justice.2 In order to prevent arbitrariness, the selection of such a metric can be justified by 
the demand of certain substantiated axioms. 
Apart from a rudimentary attempt by Miller (cf. 1999) there are as yet no such metrics of 
needs-based justice. Jasso (cf. 1999, 2007, Jasso and Wegener 1997) proposes general met-
rics of justice that are formally more developed than Miller's but nonetheless not prima-
rily axiomatically motivated.3 Jasso (cf. 1978) refers to a number of other proposals by 
Adams (cf. 1965), Berger and colleagues (cf. 1972), Homans (cf. 1974) as well as Walster 
and colleagues (cf. 1976). Eriksson discusses further rudimentary metrics with Jasso in 
view (cf. Eriksson, 2012). 
A similar issue, where metrics are applied, can be found in the measurement of povert, 
where some approaches make use of subjective poverty lines (cf. Goedhart et al., 1977, 
Flink and van Praag, 1991), as well as in the measurement of inequality and welfare with 
heterogeneous needs, where amongst others Atkinson and Bourguignon (cf. 1987) must 
be mentioned, as well as Lambert and Ramos (cf. 2002, Chakravarty, 2009). 
This variety of prominent highlights does not by far exhaust the range of possible approa-
ches that can be utilized for metrics of needs-based justice. But already here it becomes 
clear that some criteria are necessary by which this amount of possible approaches can be 
assessed. Again, it seems obvious to follow the research of measuring poverty, where – as 
seen above – a partially similar, though not identical, issue is at hand. With Sen (cf. 1976) 
the formulation of desirable axioms that a metric should meet ideally, has found wide 
dissemination. The following considerations on needs-based justice originated based on 
this approach. They can be extrapolated from this exemplary framework and applied onto 
different other combinations of legitimate demands and actual allocations, so they can be 
seen as a basis for an axiomatic of distributive justice in general. 
In the following there is no coherent or self-contained axiomatic to be presented that 
could be understood as a necessary or sufficient set of consistent axioms for the assess-
ment or the modelling of metrics of needs-based justice. Such an axiomatic would have to 
be justified first of all on normative grounds, which is not intended here. The intention is 
rather to analyse and present possibilities. This happens against the background of a sepa-
ration of normative statements and scientific analysis, as pointed out by Max Weber.4 
                                                          
 
 
2 This may evoke associations with philosophers from the 17th century, when some philosophers orientated themselves 
towards mathematics. Exemplarily Spinoza comes into view, who developed his “Ethics” based on the “geometric method” 
with definitions, axioms, theorems and proofs. 
3 One exception might be given by the considerations regarding an axiom of comparison (cf. Jasso, 1990). 
4 Contrary perspectives have been discussed in the course of the German value judgement dispute (cf. Albert 2010) and in the 
course of the positivism dispute (cf. Dahms, 1994). Weber himself writes in the mentioned lecture: “For opinions on issues of 
practical politics and the academic analysis of political institutions and party policies are two very different things. If you speak 
about democracy at a public meeting there is no need to make a secret of your personal point of view. On the contrary, you 
have to take one side or the other explicitly; that is your damned duty. The words you use are not the tools of academic 
analysis, but a way of winning others over to your political point of view. They are not plowshares to loosen the solid soil of 
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He cites Tolstoy in his lecture on “Science as a vocation” on the questions, what the mean-
ing of science could be: “Science is meaningless because it has no answer to the only ques-
tions that matter to us: 'What should we do? How shall we live?'” (Weber, 2004, p. 17) 
According to Weber, science could – relating to problems of practical philosophy – no-
netheless provide clarity: 
Always assuming that clarity is something we ourselves possess. Insofar as we do, we can make clear to 
you that in practice we can adopt this or that attitude toward the value problem at issue […]. Of course, he 
can say to you that if you wish to achieve this or that end, you will have to put up with certain accom-
panying consequences that experience tells us are bound to make their appearance. […] This brings us to 
the last contribution that science can make in the service of clarity, and at the same time we reach its li-
mits. We can and should tell you that the meaning of this or that practical stance can be inferred consis-
tently, and hence also honestly, from this or that ultimate fundamental ideological position. It may be de-
ducible from one position, or from a number – but there are other quite specific philosophies from which 
it cannot be inferred. […] The discipline of philosophy and the discussion of what are ultimately the philo-
sophical bases of the individual disciplines all attempt to achieve this. (Weber, 2004, p. 26) 
It is in this sense that some first considerations on fundamental desiderata of normative 
claims are to be presented. However, this can not provide completeness. The presented 
desiderata are to be understood as axioms that are not meant to be individually necessary 
or collectively sufficient but as an arguable and expandable groundwork that can be useful 
for the compilation of consistent axiomatics. 
1 Some first considerations on Axioms for Metrics of Distributive 
Justice shown by the Example of Needs-Based Justice 
Using the example of needs-based justice, a first cataloguing of possible desiderata or 
axioms for metrics of distributive justice is to be introduced. What is not to be presented 
is a concrete axiomatic in the form of a selection of a consistent set out of this catalogue. 
This remains the task of a seperate normative discourse. 
The need of an individual is regarded to be a fundamental factor for the evaluation of 
justice. How much an individual person should rightfully receive then depends on this 
very factor. By exchanging this basis of legitimation, an axiomatic could be extended to 
other principles of distributive justice. 
To obtain a precise formalisation of the axioms first of all a notation is to be introduced. 
Subsequently, there are different classes of axioms – that is for measurement, monotonici-
ty, transfers, population growth and sensitivity – to be presented that are followed by so-
me final remarks. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                    
contemplative thought, but swords to be used against your opponents: weapons, in short. In a lecture room it would be an 
outrage to make use of language in this way.” (Weber, 2004, p. 20) 
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1.1 Notation5 
A notation for the formalisation of the following axioms has to include the aspects that 
are considered to be relevant for metrics of needs-based justice. Such a selection of rele-
vant aspects is, of course, never free of assumptions and always represents a more or less 
aware selection. 
The individuals, whose needs and actual allocations of a given good or bad are to be 
considered in regards to a metric, are referred to as a set P, consisting of n individuals i = 
{1, 2, …, n}. Those individuals do not have to represent single persons. They can include 
groups of persons as well, for example households or institutions. 
It is assumed that every individual i has an actual allocation γi of the given good or bad. 
This is quantified within the non-negative real numbers, γi ∈ ℝ0+. Moreover let ?⃗?𝛾 = {γ1, γ2, 
…, γn} be a vector and 
Γ =∑ 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖
𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1  
be the sum of the overall available amount of the given good or bad that does not have to 
be limited to physical goods, but that of course has to be quantifiable. 
With regard to the given good or bad whose distribution is to be assessed, it is assumed 
that every individual i has, independent from its γi, a need that is denoted νi and that is 
used to determine, when the individual is considered as undersupplied, supplied or over-
supplied with respect to that given good or bad. It also is quantified within the non-
negative real numbers, νi ∈ ℝ0+. Here let 𝜈𝜈 = {ν1, ν2, …, νn} be a vector and 
Ν = ∑ 𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖
𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1  
be the sum of the overall existing needs for the given good or bad. Using γi and νi, one can 
now distinguish an individual i in terms of its supply situation. From this classification we 
obtain the subsets U, S and O from the set P.6 
An individual is considered as undersupplied with respect to a given good or bad, when it 
has less units of it than its need demands. It is considered as supplied, if it has exactly as 
many units as its need demands. When it has more units of it than its need demands, it is 
considered as oversupplied. 
DEFINITION 1 (UNDERSUPPLY): i is undersupplied, if γi < νi; the set of undersupplied indivi-
duals is U = {i ∈ P : γi < νi}. 
DEFINITION 2 (SUPPLY): i is supplied, if γi = νi; the set of supplied individuals is 
S = {i ∈ P : γi = νi}. 
                                                          
 
 
5 The presented notation is apart from some minor deviations a result of joint work with Mark Siebel, Nils Springhorn, Stefan 
Traub and Arne Robert Weiß within the subproject “Metrics of needs-based justice, expertise and coherence” as part of the 
research group “Needs-based justice and distribution procedures” funded by the German Research Foundation. 
6 Gamma and Ny have been chosen following the terms “goods” and “needs”. The denotions of the subsets follow the terms 
“undersupplied”, “supplied” and “oversupplied”. 
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DEFINITION 3 (OVERSUPPLY): i is oversupplied, if γi > νi; the set of oversupplied individuals 
is 
O = {i ∈ P : γi > νi}. 
Following the distinction of micro and macro justice, this perspective on individual allot-
ments has to be aggregated to indices that focus on the overall justice of a distribution (cf. 
Brickman et al., 1981, Berger et al., 1972, Arts et al., 1991, Jasso, 1983). Such indices are de-
noted J. 
DEFINITION 4 (INDEX OF DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE): An index of distributive justice is a func-
tion 𝐽𝐽:ℝ𝑛𝑛𝑥𝑥ℝ𝑛𝑛 → ℝ. 
To compare the indicated justice that an index attributes ti several distributions at least 
on an ordinal level, it is defined that an index should present a lower function value for a 
distribution that is considered as more just. 
DEFINITION 5 (ORDER OF DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE VALUES): An index of distributive justice J 
denotes higher justice to a distribution (𝛾𝛾𝑎𝑎���⃗ , 𝜈𝜈𝑎𝑎����⃗ ) than it does to a distribution (𝛾𝛾𝑏𝑏����⃗ , 𝜈𝜈𝑏𝑏����⃗ ) if 
𝐽𝐽(𝛾𝛾𝑎𝑎���⃗ , 𝜈𝜈𝑎𝑎����⃗ ) < 𝐽𝐽(𝛾𝛾𝑏𝑏����⃗ , 𝜈𝜈𝑏𝑏����⃗ ). 
While this definition only includes an interpretation of the function value, it is up to the 
following proposals for axioms to determine, which alternative of two distributions is to 
be regarded as more or less just. 
1.2 Exemplary Metrics of Needs-Based Justice 
To illustrate how such indices of needs-based justice might look like, some exemplary 
ones shall be introduced at this point. A consistent axiomatic that can include parts of the 
following suggestion, can then be used to asses those or other indices. 
One obvious starting point for metrics of needs-based justice might be the justice evalua-
tion function or the justice indices presented by Jasso (cf. 1978, 1980, 1990, 1996, 1999, 
2007, Jasso und Wegener, 1997). For Jasso, justice evaluations are based on a comparison 
of an actual allotment and a person’s due, which is not ideologically specified by her. For 
this comparison, she uses the natural logarithm of the ratio of the two variables. Adopted 
to the above introduced notation it can be written as: 
JJasso (𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖 , 𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖) = 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 �𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖� 
Jasso – and Watts below – follow another interpretation of the function value than the 
one demanded by definition 5. In her case it is possible to interpret a functional value of 0 
as a situation of being exactly supplied, while negative values represent an unjust under-
supply and positive values represent an unjust oversupply; with absolute values having a 
stronger impact for cases of undersupply through the logarithmic function. 
Jasso (cf. 1999) suggests the arithmetic mean as a possible way of aggregating such indivi-
dual justice evaluation functions. A possible aggregation of such individual justice evalua-
tions that has similarities to the poverty index of Watts (cf. 1968, Zheng, 1993) could be 
written as follows: 
JWatts (?⃗?𝛾, 𝜈𝜈) = 1
𝑛𝑛
∑ 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1 �
𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖
𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖
� 
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After pointing out the closeness to the measurement of poverty, there is another option 
offered by the transformation of the relative poverty gap or the poverty measure from 
Foster and colleagues (cf. 1984) respectively, which is quite prominent in the field of 
poverty measurement (cf. Kockläuner, 2012). Transferred to the above introduced notati-
on, the measure of Foster and colleagues can then be written as follows: 
JFoster (?⃗?𝛾, 𝜈𝜈) = 1
𝑛𝑛
∑ �
(𝜗𝜗−𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖)
𝜗𝜗
�
𝛼𝛼
𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1  
In the same way as the relative poverty gap, here the ratios of the differences from pover-
ty line – denoted as ϑ – and the actual allotments are in view. Foster extends this with the 
power of α that can be interpreted as a constant proportional risk aversion (cf. Kockläu-
ner, 2012). 
In this form, the index could be transferred to consider undersupplied individuals in me-
ans of needs. To achieve an index that considers the whole set of individuals it could be 
extended as follows, where, through U and O, the subsets of the under- and oversupplied 
individuals are taken into account separately, while P takes the set of individuals as a 
whole into consideration: 
Jbauer (?⃗?𝛾, 𝜈𝜈) = |𝑈𝑈||𝑃𝑃| ∑ �(𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖−𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖)𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖 �𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖∈𝑈𝑈 + |𝑂𝑂||𝑃𝑃|∑ �(𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖−𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖)𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖 �𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖∈𝑂𝑂  
Here the under- and oversupplied individuals are taken into account separately with two 
different sums, weighted by their share of the whole population. The powers α and β are 
parameters of aversion against under- or oversupply that can represent higher or lower 
aversions in accordance with their size; the higher the power, the higher the depicted 
injustice of the respective sum. With a value lower than 1, it would furthermore be possib-
le to take affinities in account, for example for oversupply. 
1.3 Possible Axioms of Needs-Based Justice 
Besides those exemplary metrics it is in principle possible to use any function of needs 
and allotments as an index of needs-based justice. The resulting amount of possibilities 
has to be restricted in a reasonable way. This can be achieved – as stated above – by de-
manding certain axioms that such an index ideally has to meet (cf. Scheicher, 2009). In 
the following, axioms shall be understood as the stating of formal or content-wise sub-
stantiated properties that metric demands and that can constitute a basis for classifying 
metrics in those that are acceptable or those that have to be dismissed (cf. von der Lippe, 
1996). Axioms or desiderata in this sense are used as a basis for constructing or evaluating 
metrics in different areas of research; for example, within the frame of economic sciences 
with regard to measurement of inequality, poverty or wealth (cf. Scheicher, 2009, Herlyn, 
2012). 
Amongst a variety of formally or methodically motivated axioms, which are to be 
presented at the beginning of the subsection, a number of content-wise motivated ones 
has to be introduced. In the following, some possible axioms are presented. They are me-
ant to be a collection of discussable basic assumptions that can be composed modularly to 
assemble an axiomatic as a basis for the construction or evaluation of possible metrics. 
For better overview the axioms are divided into several classes: First the methodically 
motivated axioms are presented, followed by those of monotonicity, which deal with vari-
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ations in allotments of a given good for a single individual. These axioms are followed by 
axioms of transfer, which focus on transfers between several individuals. Axioms of popu-
lation growth deal with variations of a given population. Finally, axioms of sensitivity 
focus on the intensity of deviations from an allotment of an individual to its due need. 
Thus, it shall be attempted to cover possible desirable properties of metrics within the 
scope of some obvious normative claims in the contexts of monotonicity, transfers, popu-
lation growth and sensitivities that have been transformed and adjusted from poverty 
measurement. Thereby a catalogue of different conceivable axioms is presented; the axi-
oms being in part mutually exclusive and thereby making a selection that has to orientate 
itself on the desired normative aspects that a certain index should represent, indispensab-
le. This selection has to take place within the context of a normative discourse and has to 
face the thereby accompanying challenges and problems. 
Methodically Motivated Axioms 
The methodically motivated axioms sum up all those axioms that are not primarily moti-
vated by normative reflections, but rather seem useful within the methodically scope of 
measuring. Nonetheless, they can of course have relevance for normative claims and 
should not be misunderstood as independent and without assumptions or as somehow 
neutral. 
An axiom of scale invariance (cf. Seidl, 1988, Kockläuner, 2012) demands of indices that 
they do not change when the needs and allotments are scaled by the same factor. Analo-
gous to metrics of poverty, it is possible to speak about relative metrics of needs-based 
justice when this axiom is satisfied.7 
AXIOM 1 (SCALE INVARIANCE): 𝐽𝐽(𝜆𝜆 ⋅ ?⃗?𝛾, 𝜆𝜆 ⋅ 𝜈𝜈) = 𝐽𝐽(?⃗?𝛾, 𝜈𝜈), 𝜆𝜆 > 0. 
Every index that is scale invariant in such a way also satisfies a demand for replication 
invariance: To allow for comparison of two groups Pa and Pb with different numbers of 
individuals, this axiom requires for poverty measurement that the function value of an 
index does not vary through a replication of individuals: Then one has 𝐽𝐽(𝛾𝛾𝑎𝑎���⃗ , 𝜈𝜈𝑎𝑎����⃗ ) = 𝐽𝐽(𝛾𝛾𝑏𝑏����⃗ , 𝜈𝜈𝑏𝑏����⃗ ) 
if 𝛾𝛾𝑏𝑏����⃗  and 𝜈𝜈𝑏𝑏����⃗  are obtained from 𝛾𝛾𝑎𝑎���⃗  and 𝜈𝜈𝑎𝑎����⃗  by depicting a replication, in which for every 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖 
and 𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖 out of 𝛾𝛾𝑎𝑎���⃗  and 𝜈𝜈𝑎𝑎����⃗  there is a quantity increased by the factor of λ in 𝛾𝛾𝑏𝑏����⃗  and 𝜈𝜈𝑏𝑏����⃗ . Scale 
invariant indices also satisfy the demand for unity consistence that requires for indices to 
be independent from conversion in other unities, for example from Euro to Dollar (cf. 
Zheng, 2007). 
Furthermore, an axiom of symmetry requires irrelevance concerning the question, which 
individual is associated with a certain pair 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖 , 𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖; a commutation of pairs between indivi-
duals should leave an index unchanged. This axiom makes sure that an evaluation of 
needs-based justice depends solely on the chosen factors – in this case the components of 
the pairs – and thereby is without distinction of person. In poverty measurement, such an 
                                                          
 
 
7 Whereas a relative index therefore is invariant for same percentage changes, an absolute index is invariant for same changes 
in addition or subtraction: An according axiom of translation invariance can demand that the functional value of J does not 
vary if the needs and allotments are increased or reduced by the same δ. 
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axiom is strikingly named an axiom of anonymity; symbolically represented by the blind-
fold of Justitia. 
AXIOM 2 (SYMMETRY): If 𝜈𝜈𝑏𝑏����⃗  and 𝛾𝛾𝑏𝑏����⃗  are obtained from 𝜈𝜈𝑎𝑎����⃗  and 𝛾𝛾𝑎𝑎���⃗  by changing two individu-
als i, j ∈ P, then 𝐽𝐽(𝛾𝛾𝑎𝑎���⃗ , 𝜈𝜈𝑎𝑎����⃗ ) = 𝐽𝐽(𝛾𝛾𝑏𝑏����⃗ , 𝜈𝜈𝑏𝑏����⃗ ). 
To avoid abrupt changes in the functional value of an index and therefor to make sure 
that infinitesimal changes in𝛾𝛾and𝜈𝜈only lead to accordingly small changes in the functio-
nal value, an axiom of continuity can be demanded. 
AXIOM 3 (CONTINUITY): 𝐽𝐽(?⃗?𝛾, 𝜈𝜈) is continuous in 𝛾𝛾 and 𝜈𝜈. 
Since there is no concrete measurement unit for justice in general or needs-based justice 
in particular, like meter for length or bar for pressure, it is demanded that the index num-
ber should be a dimensionless value. With an axiom of normalization, it can be demanded 
that the value is normalized for example on the interval [0,1]. 
AXIOM 4 (NORMALIZATION): For all ?⃗?𝛾 and 𝜈𝜈 it holds that 0 ≤ 𝐽𝐽(𝛾𝛾⃗, 𝜈𝜈⃗) ≤ 1. 
The functional value of an index can be varied depending on preferred aspects of interpre-
tation. Jasso for example uses a scale that is not constrained. In her case 0 represents a 
just allotment, while negative values represent an unjust shortage and positive values 
represent an unjust surplus of a given good or bad, with no maximum values in both cases 
(cf. Jasso, 2007). In the following a functional value of 0 shall depict a just allotment, while 
greater positive values represent unjust allotments. Only exception shall be the axiom of 
continuously increasing monotonicity. 
Both the axiom of continuity and of normalization are important for the comparability of 
different sets Pa to Pm with regard to their needs-based justice. They are also relevant for 
the aspired scale level of an index that determines if several sets can only be interpreted 
on an ordinal scale or can be compared on a more fine grained scale, for example on an 
interval scale (cf. Stevens, 1947). 
By forming subgroups of a set P along certain characteristics – for example age, social 
stratum or geographic location – it becomes possible to make statements on their share of 
the overall injustice. Those can give indications for reducing specific injustices for examp-
le through policy actions.8 An axiom of subgroup consistency demands accordingly that 
the indicated needs-based justice of an index increases or decreases, if it does so in one of 
several disjunctive subgroups, while remaining constant in the others (cf. Foster et al., 
1984, Foster and Shorrocks, 1991, Zheng, 1997). 
AXIOM 5 (SUBGROUP CONSISTENCY): If 𝛾𝛾𝑎𝑎���⃗  and 𝜈𝜈𝑎𝑎����⃗  are disaggregated into 𝛾𝛾𝑎𝑎′�����⃗  and 𝜈𝜈𝑎𝑎′�����⃗  plus 𝛾𝛾𝑎𝑎′′������⃗  
and 𝜈𝜈𝑎𝑎′′������⃗  as well as 𝛾𝛾𝑏𝑏����⃗  and 𝜈𝜈𝑏𝑏����⃗  are disaggregated into 𝛾𝛾𝑏𝑏′�����⃗  and 𝜈𝜈𝑏𝑏′�����⃗  plus 𝛾𝛾𝑏𝑏′′������⃗  and 𝜈𝜈𝑏𝑏′′������⃗  (with 𝛾𝛾𝑎𝑎���⃗ =
                                                          
 
 
8 In the context of measuring poverty, Anand has early made the importance of decomposability clear. Referring to the above 
mentioned Sen, he states: „The Sen measure is, unfortunately, not decomposable between groups. Yet, in the design of 
poverty redressal policies, it would seem important to be informed of the extent to which a particular group accounts for 
overall poverty. [...] A diagnosis of poverty requires answers to questions such as: Who are the poor? Where are they located? 
In which sectors do they work? What are the characteristics of the poor that are different from those of the non-poor?” 
(Anand, 1977, p. 12) 
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𝛾𝛾𝑎𝑎′�����⃗ + 𝛾𝛾𝑎𝑎′′������⃗ , 𝜈𝜈𝑎𝑎����⃗ = 𝜈𝜈𝑎𝑎′�����⃗ + 𝜈𝜈𝑎𝑎′′������⃗  and 𝛾𝛾𝑏𝑏����⃗ = 𝛾𝛾𝑏𝑏′�����⃗ + 𝛾𝛾𝑏𝑏′′������⃗ , 𝜈𝜈𝑏𝑏����⃗ = 𝜈𝜈𝑏𝑏′�����⃗ + 𝜈𝜈𝑏𝑏′′������⃗ ) with 𝐽𝐽(𝛾𝛾𝑎𝑎′�����⃗ , 𝜈𝜈𝑎𝑎′�����⃗ ) < 𝐽𝐽(𝛾𝛾𝑏𝑏′�����⃗ , 𝜈𝜈𝑏𝑏′�����⃗ ) 
and  𝐽𝐽(𝛾𝛾𝑎𝑎′′������⃗ , 𝜈𝜈𝑎𝑎′′������⃗ ) = 𝐽𝐽(𝛾𝛾𝑏𝑏′′������⃗ , 𝜈𝜈𝑏𝑏′′������⃗ ), then 𝐽𝐽(𝛾𝛾𝑎𝑎���⃗ , 𝜈𝜈𝑎𝑎����⃗ ) < 𝐽𝐽(𝛾𝛾𝑏𝑏����⃗ , 𝜈𝜈𝑏𝑏����⃗ ). 
An axiom of weighted decomposability eventually demands that an index of an evaluated 
set P should be equal to the sum of its proportionally weighted subsets Pa to Pm, if M sub-
groups m = {1, 2, …, m} are composed with a population share of nz / n each, so that an 
increase or decrease in one of the subgroups’ index has an effect according to the number 
of individuals the subgroup contains. 
AXIOM 6 (WEIGHTED DECOMPOSABILITY): It holds 𝐽𝐽(?⃗?𝛾, 𝜈𝜈) = ∑ 𝑛𝑛𝑧𝑧
𝑛𝑛
𝑀𝑀
𝑚𝑚=1 𝐽𝐽(𝛾𝛾𝑧𝑧���⃗ , 𝜈𝜈𝑧𝑧���⃗ ). 
Axioms of Monotonicity 
Axioms of monotonicity consider changes in the allotment γi of an individual i. They are 
non-comparative, that is, they rely only on the parameters of need and allotment and do 
not depend on factors like the position of an individual with regard to the remaining indi-
viduals of a group, as it could be demanded from a comparative point of view (cf. Fein-
berg, 1974, Montague, 1980). 
Based on the mathematical description of functions it is possible to describe several cases 
for changes in the allotment γi and the associated values of justice through the term of 
monotonicity. Justice is monotonic increasing if the function value of J does not denote 
lower justice with an increase of γi, so according to definition 5 the function value of an 
index J does not increase. 
DEFINITION 6 (MONOTONIC INCREASING JUSTICE): If γi < γi′ then J(νi, γi) ≥ J(νi, γi′). 
Justice is called strictly monotonic increasing if the function value of J does denote greater 
justice with an increase of γi. 
DEFINITION 7 (STRICTLY MONOTONIC INCREASING JUSTICE): If γi < γi′ then J(νi, γi) > (νi, γi′). 
It is instead called monotonic decreasing if the function value of J does not denote greater 
justice with an increase of γi. 
DEFINITION 8 (MONOTONIC DECREASING JUSTICE): If γi < γi′ then J(νi, γi) ≤ (νi, γi′). 
Finally, justice can be called strictly monotonic decreasing if the function value of J does 
denote lower justice with an increase of γi. 
DEFINITION 9 (STRICTLY MONOTONIC DECREASING JUSTICE): If γi < γi′ then J(νi, γi) < J(νi, 
γi′). 
An index J can of course be sectionwise defined with regards to its monotonicity. 
Furthermore, it is possible that different kinds of needs evoke different definitions of mo-
notonicity. While in the following the value of allotment γi is varied exclusively, it is of 
course also conceivable to vary the value of need νi, which should be assumed to be static 
in this paper, so that it is possible to concentrate on distributions of goods or bads with 
heterogeneous but unchanging needs. Moreover, there are two possible ways of formula-
ting axioms; either the ratio or the absolute distance of needs and allotments is consi-
dered. While this may appear within the scope of axioms of monotonicity as merely two 
different representation methods, since both will lead the axioms to identical conclusions, 
they obtain importance for the following axioms of transfer: Here it becomes possible to 
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have identical distributions that lead the axioms in their absolute or relative formulation 
to demanding different behaviours for an index. For that reason, some of the axioms shall 
be presented in both ways. 
The idea of monotonicity seems simple for cases of undersupply: As long as an individual 
has a lack of a certain good, an increase of its allotment should be understood as more 
just. But for the case of oversupply, there are different normative claims imaginable. 
Axioms of invert monotonicity can be associated with the principle of homoeostasis, that 
– exemplarily for physiological contexts – assumes that things level off between states of 
too much and too little. One may also think about the concept of μεσότης in the work of 
Aristotle, who makes the disposition between lack and excess central for his conception of 
virtue, or about the philosophical debate on theories of sufficiency. Moreover, invert mo-
notonicity has special relevance for the possibility of meeting the needs of undersupplied 
individuals: That what constitutes the oversupply of one person could be used to meet the 
need of another person that is undersupplied with regards to the considered good – at 
least if other principles of justice are suppressed so that only needs are in focus. 
For the first possible axiom of monotonicity it shall be assumed that an exact meeting of 
needs is the ideal state for a distribution, so that both undersupply and oversupply are 
perceived as unjust. This does not mean that an identical absolute value of under- and 
oversupply has to be treated identical as will be seen with the axioms of sensitivity. 
The axiom of invert monotonicity in its relative form demands accordingly that – ceteris 
paribus – a change of the allotment γi of an individual i out of the set P lets denote an 
index J greater needs-based justice, if the ratio of allotment γi and need νi is smaller after-
wards. Thereby it is assumed – as discussed within the scope of an axiom of normalization 
– that greater needs-based justice is indicated by a lower value of J towards 0. 
AXIOM 7.1 (RELATIVE INVERT MONOTONICITY): If 𝛾𝛾𝑏𝑏����⃗  is retrieved from 𝛾𝛾𝑎𝑎���⃗  by having for an i 
∈ P a δ so that γbi = γai ± δ, then 𝐽𝐽(𝛾𝛾𝑎𝑎���⃗ , 𝜈𝜈) > 𝐽𝐽(𝛾𝛾𝑏𝑏����⃗ , 𝜈𝜈),if Ρai > Ρbi, or then 𝐽𝐽(𝛾𝛾𝑎𝑎���⃗ , 𝜈𝜈) < 𝐽𝐽(𝛾𝛾𝑏𝑏����⃗ , 𝜈𝜈), if 
Ρai < Ρbi (with Ρ = γ / ν, if (ν / γ) < 1, and Ρ = ν / γ, if (ν / γ) > 1). 
In the absolute variation this axiom considers no longer the ratio of allotment γi and need 
νi but the absolute distances between the two variables. 
AXIOM 7.2 (ABSOLUTE INVERT MONOTONICITY): If 𝛾𝛾𝑏𝑏����⃗  is retrieved from 𝛾𝛾𝑎𝑎���⃗  by having for an i 
∈ P a δ so that γbi = γai ± δ, then 𝐽𝐽(𝛾𝛾𝑎𝑎���⃗ , 𝜈𝜈) > 𝐽𝐽(𝛾𝛾𝑏𝑏����⃗ , 𝜈𝜈), if |νi −γai | > |νi −γbi |, or then 𝐽𝐽(𝛾𝛾𝑎𝑎���⃗ , 𝜈𝜈) <
𝐽𝐽(𝛾𝛾𝑏𝑏����⃗ , 𝜈𝜈), if |νi  −γai | < |νi −γbi |. 
Those requirements can be depicted in two and three dimensional visualisations. In the 
following examples the justice increases (the function value of J decreases) in a linear 
manner with a convergence of allotment and need. The function value is 0 if allotment 
and need meet. 
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Fig. 1: Two and three dimensional visual examples for invert monotonicity of justice 
For the three dimensional visualisation the function values for the possible pairs from νi 
and γi of some individual i are depicted with γi = x and νi = y on an intervall [0, 10] with x, 
y ∈ ℕ, where J = z and exemplarily z = |x − y|. 
With another variation of an axiom of monotonicity it would be possible to demand the 
same for undersupply and supply, while being different for the case of oversupply, so that 
changes of allotments above a needs threshold would not change the functional value. 
This could be desirable if one assumes that a concept of needs is only applicable for cases 
of undersupply. An axiom of limited monotonicity demands accordingly that – ceteris 
paribus – a change of the allotment γi of an individual i out of the set P lets denote an 
index J greater needs-based justice, if the relative distance between allotment γi and need 
νi is smaller afterwards, provided that neither initially nor finally a situation of being 
supplied or oversupplied is given. Otherwise the index does not change, if the allotment 
varies. 
AXIOM 8.1 (RELATIVE LIMITED MONOTONICITY): If 𝛾𝛾𝑏𝑏����⃗  is retrieved from 𝛾𝛾𝑎𝑎���⃗  by having for an i 
∈ P a δ so that γbi = γai ± δ, then 𝐽𝐽(𝛾𝛾𝑎𝑎���⃗ , 𝜈𝜈) > 𝐽𝐽(𝛾𝛾𝑏𝑏����⃗ , 𝜈𝜈), if Ρai > Ρbi, or then𝐽𝐽(𝛾𝛾𝑎𝑎���⃗ , 𝜈𝜈) < 𝐽𝐽(𝛾𝛾𝑏𝑏����⃗ , 𝜈𝜈), if 
Ρai < Ρbi (with Ρ = γ / ν, if (ν / γ) < 1, and Ρ = ν / γ, if (ν / γ) > 1), provided that i in 𝛾𝛾𝑎𝑎���⃗ , i in 𝛾𝛾𝑏𝑏����⃗  
∉ S ∪ O. Provided that i in 𝛾𝛾𝑎𝑎���⃗ , i in 𝛾𝛾𝑏𝑏����⃗  ∈ S ∪ O, it holds 𝐽𝐽(𝛾𝛾𝑎𝑎���⃗ , 𝜈𝜈) = 𝐽𝐽(𝛾𝛾𝑏𝑏����⃗ , 𝜈𝜈). 
AXIOM 8.2 (ABSOLUTE LIMITED MONOTONICITY): If 𝛾𝛾𝑏𝑏����⃗  is retrieved from 𝛾𝛾𝑎𝑎���⃗  by having for an 
i ∈ P a δ so that γbi = γai ± δ, then 𝐽𝐽(𝛾𝛾𝑎𝑎���⃗ , 𝜈𝜈) > 𝐽𝐽(𝛾𝛾𝑏𝑏����⃗ , 𝜈𝜈), if |νi −γai | > |νi −γbi |, or then 𝐽𝐽(𝛾𝛾𝑎𝑎���⃗ , 𝜈𝜈) <
𝐽𝐽(𝛾𝛾𝑏𝑏����⃗ , 𝜈𝜈), if |νi  −γai | < |νi −γbi |, provided that i in𝛾𝛾𝑎𝑎���⃗ , i in 𝛾𝛾𝑏𝑏����⃗  ∉ S ∪ O. Provided that i in 𝛾𝛾𝑎𝑎���⃗ , i 
in 𝛾𝛾𝑏𝑏����⃗  ∈ S ∪ O, it holds 𝐽𝐽(𝛾𝛾𝑎𝑎���⃗ , 𝜈𝜈) = 𝐽𝐽(𝛾𝛾𝑏𝑏����⃗ , 𝜈𝜈). 
This demands can also be presented in two and three dimensional visualisations, where 
the function value only increases in cases of undersupply. In cases of oversupply it 
remains constant.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2: Two and three dimensional visual examples for limited monotonicity of justice 
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With a third variation of an axiom of monotonicity it would be possible to demand inde-
pendently from the situation of supply that an increase in allotment lets an index indicate 
a greater needs-based justice. An axiom of continuously increasing monotonicity de-
mands accordingly that – ceteris paribus – a change of the allotment γi of an individual i 
out of the set P lets denote an index J greater needs-based justice, if the relative distance 
between allotment γi and need νi is smaller afterwards in the range of undersupply or gre-
ater afterwards in the range of oversupply. 
AXIOM 9.1 (RELATIVE CONTINUOUSLY INCREASING MONOTONICITY): If 𝛾𝛾𝑏𝑏����⃗  is retrieved from 
𝛾𝛾𝑎𝑎���⃗  by having for an i ∈ P a δ so that γbi = γai ± δ, then𝐽𝐽(𝛾𝛾𝑎𝑎���⃗ , 𝜈𝜈) > 𝐽𝐽(𝛾𝛾𝑏𝑏����⃗ , 𝜈𝜈), if Ρai > Ρbi, or then 
𝐽𝐽(𝛾𝛾𝑎𝑎���⃗ , 𝜈𝜈) < 𝐽𝐽(𝛾𝛾𝑏𝑏����⃗ , 𝜈𝜈), if Ρai < Ρbi (with Ρ = γ / ν, if (ν / γ) < 1, and Ρ = ν / γ, if (ν / γ) > 1), provi-
ded that i in 𝛾𝛾𝑎𝑎���⃗ , i in 𝛾𝛾𝑏𝑏����⃗  ∈ U, S. Provided that i in 𝛾𝛾𝑎𝑎���⃗ , i in 𝛾𝛾𝑏𝑏����⃗  ∈ S ∪ O, it holds 𝐽𝐽(𝛾𝛾𝑎𝑎���⃗ , 𝜈𝜈) >
𝐽𝐽(𝛾𝛾𝑏𝑏����⃗ , 𝜈𝜈), if Ρai < Ρb, or then 𝐽𝐽(𝛾𝛾𝑎𝑎���⃗ , 𝜈𝜈) < 𝐽𝐽(𝛾𝛾𝑏𝑏����⃗ , 𝜈𝜈), if Ρai > Ρb. 
AXIOM 9.2 (ABSOLUTE CONTINUOUSLY INCREASING MONOTONICITY): If 𝛾𝛾𝑏𝑏����⃗  is retrieved from 
𝛾𝛾𝑎𝑎���⃗  by having for an i ∈ P a δ so that γbi = γai ± δ, then 𝐽𝐽(𝛾𝛾𝑎𝑎���⃗ , 𝜈𝜈) > 𝐽𝐽(𝛾𝛾𝑏𝑏����⃗ , 𝜈𝜈), if 
|νi −γai | > |νi −γbi |, or then 𝐽𝐽(𝛾𝛾𝑎𝑎���⃗ , 𝜈𝜈) < 𝐽𝐽(𝛾𝛾𝑏𝑏����⃗ , 𝜈𝜈), if |νi  −γai | < |νi −γbi |, provided that i in 𝛾𝛾𝑎𝑎���⃗ , i 
in 𝛾𝛾𝑏𝑏����⃗  ∈ U, S. Provided that i in 𝛾𝛾𝑎𝑎���⃗ , i in 𝛾𝛾𝑏𝑏����⃗  ∈ S ∪ O, it holds 𝐽𝐽(𝛾𝛾𝑎𝑎���⃗ , 𝜈𝜈) > 𝐽𝐽(𝛾𝛾𝑏𝑏����⃗ , 𝜈𝜈), if |νi −γai | < 
|νi −γbi |, or 𝐽𝐽(𝛾𝛾𝑎𝑎���⃗ , 𝜈𝜈) < 𝐽𝐽(𝛾𝛾𝑏𝑏����⃗ , 𝜈𝜈), if |νi  −γai | > |νi −γbi |. 
On an increased interval these axioms can be visualised as follows, where the function 
value of J decreases with further oversupply and so depict greater justice. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3: Two and three dimensional visual examples for continuously increasing monotonicity of justice 
Axioms of Transfer 
Axioms of transfer deal with reallocations of a given quantity Γ of a good or bad between 
several individuals, here denoted as i and j. 
DEFINITION 10 (TRANSFER): γi of i ∈ P is reduced by δ with 0 < δ ≤ γi and γj of j ∈ P is ex-
tended by the same δ simultaniousyl. 
The focus here is on the situation in which a distribution resulting of a transfer is regar-
ded as more or less just than the initial situation. Against the background of the abovein-
troduced axiom of monotonicity, this can at least be interpreted in three different ways.9 
                                                          
 
 
9 Pigou and Dalton established considerations about transfers in the scope of welfare were established by Pigou and Dalton 
(cf. Dalton, 1920). Pigou writes: „My second proposition can be stated in several ways. The most abstract form of it affirms 
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Due to space restrictions, only axioms of transfer for invert monotonicity are to be intro-
duced exemplarily. In this case the more just distribution is that, which either has a smal-
ler absolute distance between allotment and need or has a smaller ratio. 
Those two possibilities apply for all presented content-wise motivated axioms. Either the 
ratio or the absolute distance of needs and allotments is considered. While this may 
appear within the scope of axioms of monotonicity as merely two different representation 
methods, since both will lead the axioms to identical conclusions, they obtain importance 
for the following axioms of transfer: Here it becomes possible to have identical distributi-
ons that lead the axioms in their absolute or relative formulation to demanding different 
behaviours for an index. 
Due to space restrictions only the relative version is to be presented in the following. In 
the appendices A and B the content-wise motivated axioms are presented in their absolu-
te and relative version for all three introduced variations of monotonicity. 
In case of an individual i transferring a part of its allotment γi to an individual j, so that 
the sum of both ratios of needs and allotments that is denoted with the greek P, de-
creases, it can be spoken of a positive transfer. For a neutral transfer the ratios do not 
change in sum. For a negative transfer, the ratios rise in sum. 
AXIOM 10.1 (RELATIVE POSITIVE TRANSFER FOR INVERT MONOTONICITY): If for a given 𝜈𝜈 a 
𝛾𝛾𝑏𝑏����⃗  is retrieved from 𝛾𝛾𝑎𝑎���⃗  by having for an i ∈ P a δ with 0 < δ ≤ γai, that is transferred from 
γi to γj of a j ∈ P, so that finally ( Ρai + Ρaj ) > ( Ρbi + Ρbj ) (with Ρ = γ / ν, if (ν / γ) < 1, and Ρ = 
ν / γ, if (ν / γ) > 1), then𝐽𝐽(𝛾𝛾𝑎𝑎���⃗ , 𝜈𝜈) > 𝐽𝐽(𝛾𝛾𝑏𝑏����⃗ , 𝜈𝜈). 
AXIOM 10.2 (ABSOLUTE POSITIVE TRANSFER FOR INVERT MONOTONICITY): If for a given 𝜈𝜈 a 
𝛾𝛾𝑏𝑏����⃗  is retrieved from 𝛾𝛾𝑎𝑎���⃗  by having for an i ∈ P a δ with 0 < δ ≤ γai, that is transferred from 
γi to γj of a j ∈ P, so that finally ( |νai - γai| + |νaj - γaj| ) > ( |νbi - γbi| + |νbj - γbj| ), 
then𝐽𝐽(𝛾𝛾𝑎𝑎���⃗ , 𝜈𝜈) > 𝐽𝐽(𝛾𝛾𝑏𝑏����⃗ , 𝜈𝜈). 
AXIOM 11.1 (RELATIVE NEUTRAL TRANSFER FOR INVERT MONOTONICITY): If for a given 𝜈𝜈 a 
𝛾𝛾𝑏𝑏����⃗  is retrieved from 𝛾𝛾𝑎𝑎���⃗  by having for an i ∈ P a δ with 0 < δ ≤ γai, that is transferred from 
γi to γj of a j ∈ P, so that finally ( Ρai + Ρaj ) = ( Ρbi + Ρbj ) (with Ρ = γ / ν, if (ν / γ) < 1, and Ρ = 
ν / γ, if (ν / γ) > 1), then 𝐽𝐽(𝛾𝛾𝑎𝑎���⃗ , 𝜈𝜈) = 𝐽𝐽(𝛾𝛾𝑏𝑏����⃗ , 𝜈𝜈). 
AXIOM 11.2 (ABSOLUTE NEUTRAL TRANSFER FOR INVERTER MONOTONICITY): If for a given 𝜈𝜈 
a𝛾𝛾𝑏𝑏����⃗  is retrieved from 𝛾𝛾𝑎𝑎���⃗  by having for an i ∈ P a δ with 0 < δ ≤ γai, that is transferred from 
γi to γj of a j ∈ P, so that finally ( |νai - γai| + |νaj - γaj| ) = ( |νbi - γbi| + |νbj - γbj| ), then 
𝐽𝐽(𝛾𝛾𝑎𝑎���⃗ , 𝜈𝜈) = 𝐽𝐽(𝛾𝛾𝑏𝑏����⃗ , 𝜈𝜈). 
AXIOM 12.1 (RELATIVE NEGATIVE TRANSFER FOR INVERT MONOTONICITY): If for a given  𝜈𝜈 a 
𝛾𝛾𝑏𝑏����⃗  is retrieved from 𝛾𝛾𝑎𝑎���⃗  by having for an i ∈ P a δ with 0 < δ ≤ γai, that is transferred from 
                                                                                                                                                                    
that economic welfare is likely to be augmented by anything that, leaving other things unaltered, renders the distribution of 
the national dividend less unequal. If we assume all members of the community to be of similar temperament, and if these 
members are only two in number, it is easily shown that any transference from the richer to the poorer of the two, since it 
enables more intense wants to be satisfied at the expense of less intense wants, must increase the aggregate sum of satisfac-
tion.” (Pigou, 1912, p. 24) Contrary to the relevant literature on metrics of poverty, there shall no preservation of ranks be 
demanded for the case of transfers. Such ranks could be established for example by ranking individuals in case of undersupply 
from the greatest distance between allotment and need to the smallest distance and for the case of oversupply by ranking 
further from the smallest distance to the greatest distance between allotment and need. 
WISSENSCHAFTLICHE ARTIKEL 56 
 
  
Bauer: Axiomatic foundations for metrics of distributive justice 
forsch! – Studentisches Online-Journal der Universität Oldenburg 1/2017 
γi to γj of a j ∈ P, so that finally ( Ρai + Ρaj ) < ( Ρbi + Ρbj ) (with Ρ = γ / ν, if 
(ν / γ) < 1, and Ρ = ν / γ, if (ν / γ) > 1) then𝐽𝐽(𝛾𝛾𝑎𝑎���⃗ , 𝜈𝜈) < 𝐽𝐽(𝛾𝛾𝑏𝑏����⃗ , 𝜈𝜈). 
AXIOM 12.2 (ABSOLUTE NEGATIVE TRANSFER FOR INVERT MONOTONICITY): If for a given 𝜈𝜈 a 
𝛾𝛾𝑏𝑏����⃗  is retrieved from 𝛾𝛾𝑎𝑎���⃗  by having for an i ∈ P a δ with 0 < δ ≤ γai, that is transferred from 
γi to γj of a j ∈ P, so that finally ( |νai - γai| + |νaj - γaj| ) < ( |νbi - γbi| + |νbj - γbj| ), then 
𝐽𝐽(𝛾𝛾𝑎𝑎���⃗ , 𝜈𝜈) < 𝐽𝐽(𝛾𝛾𝑏𝑏����⃗ , 𝜈𝜈). 
Of course the absolute formalisations of those axioms are more interesting only for the 
remaining two variations of monotonicity, they remain somewhat trivial for invert mono-
tonicity of justice. 
Axioms of Populations Growth 
The previous axioms were focused on fix populations of P in regard of changes in the al-
lotments of a single individual or for several individuals in the case of transfers. With axi-
oms of population growth now the behaviour of an index for changing population sizes is 
to be described. 
An axiom of growth of under- or oversupplied population for invert monotonicity de-
mands that – ceteris paribus – an index should depict greater injustice, if P is extended by 
an addition individual j that is under- or oversupplied. – In contrast it holds, that for con-
tinuously increasing monotonicity such a depiction of greater injustice would be de-
manded only for an additional undersupplied individual. 
AXIOM 13 (GROWTH OF UNDER- OR OVERSUPPLIED POPULATION FOR INVERT MONOTONICI-
TY): If 𝛾𝛾𝑏𝑏����⃗  and 𝜈𝜈𝑏𝑏����⃗  are retrieved from 𝛾𝛾𝑎𝑎���⃗  and 𝜈𝜈𝑎𝑎����⃗  by having for n individuals in Pa finally n + 1 
in Pb with 𝛾𝛾𝚥𝚥���⃗ > 𝜈𝜈𝚥𝚥��⃗  or 𝛾𝛾𝚥𝚥���⃗ < 𝜈𝜈𝚥𝚥��⃗ , for the additional j ∈ P, then 𝐽𝐽(𝛾𝛾𝑎𝑎���⃗ , 𝜈𝜈𝑎𝑎����⃗ ) < 𝐽𝐽(𝛾𝛾𝑏𝑏����⃗ , 𝜈𝜈𝑏𝑏����⃗ ). 
An additional axiom of growth of supplied population for invert monotonicity demands 
that – ceteris paribus – an index should depict greater injustice, if P is extended by an 
additional individual j that is supplied. 
AXIOM 14 (GROWTH OF SUPPLIED POPULATION FOR INVERT MONOTONICITY): If𝛾𝛾𝑏𝑏����⃗  and 𝜈𝜈𝑏𝑏����⃗  
are retrieved from 𝛾𝛾𝑎𝑎���⃗  and 𝜈𝜈𝑎𝑎����⃗  by having for n individuals in Pa finally n + 1 in Pb with 𝛾𝛾𝚥𝚥���⃗ =
𝜈𝜈𝚥𝚥��⃗ , for the additional j ∈ P, then 𝐽𝐽(𝛾𝛾𝑎𝑎���⃗ , 𝜈𝜈𝑎𝑎����⃗ ) > 𝐽𝐽(𝛾𝛾𝑏𝑏����⃗ , 𝜈𝜈𝑏𝑏����⃗ ). 
Axioms of Sensitivity 
Finally, axioms of sensitivity focus on the value of the under- or oversupply of an indivi-
dual. Under and over a certain threshold of needs it is possible to apply several sensitivi-
ties. For example, an identical absolute value by which an allotment is decreased, weights 
heavier, if the starting point is farer away of the threshold of needs. An increase by the 
same absolute value above the threshold weights heavier if the starting point is closer to 
the threshold. This and other combinations can be depicted by the axioms for concave 
and convex sensitivity of monotonicity. 
For this purpose, the demand of an axiom is: The greater the relative distance of need and 
allotment is, the deeper is the impact of the change by the same absolute value. 
AXIOM 15 (CONCAVE SENSITIVITY OF MONOTONICITY): If for a given 𝜈𝜈 a 𝛾𝛾𝑏𝑏����⃗  and 𝛾𝛾𝑐𝑐���⃗  are ret-
rieved from 𝛾𝛾𝑎𝑎���⃗  by having an i ∈ P in 𝛾𝛾𝑏𝑏����⃗  and a j ∈ P in 𝛾𝛾𝑐𝑐���⃗  with initially 
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| νi − γi | < | νj − γj |, that are altered by the same δ with δ > 0 that is subtracted if i, j ∈ U 
and added by i, j ∈ O, then 𝐽𝐽(𝛾𝛾𝑏𝑏����⃗ , 𝜈𝜈) − 𝐽𝐽(𝛾𝛾𝑎𝑎���⃗ , 𝜈𝜈) ≷ 𝐽𝐽(𝛾𝛾𝑐𝑐���⃗ , 𝜈𝜈) − 𝐽𝐽(𝛾𝛾𝑎𝑎���⃗ , 𝜈𝜈), depending on the kind of 
monotonicity that is assumed: 
(1) if i, j ∈ U, then 𝐽𝐽(𝛾𝛾𝑏𝑏����⃗ , 𝜈𝜈) − 𝐽𝐽(𝛾𝛾𝑎𝑎���⃗ , 𝜈𝜈) < 𝐽𝐽(𝛾𝛾𝑐𝑐���⃗ , 𝜈𝜈) − 𝐽𝐽(𝛾𝛾𝑎𝑎���⃗ , 𝜈𝜈), 
(2) if invert monotonicity is assumed and i, j ∈ S ∪ O, then 𝐽𝐽(𝛾𝛾𝑏𝑏����⃗ , 𝜈𝜈) − 𝐽𝐽(𝛾𝛾𝑎𝑎���⃗ , 𝜈𝜈) < 𝐽𝐽(𝛾𝛾𝑐𝑐���⃗ , 𝜈𝜈) −
𝐽𝐽(𝛾𝛾𝑎𝑎���⃗ , 𝜈𝜈), 
(3) if continuously increasing monotonicity is assumed and i, j ∈ S ∪ O, then 𝐽𝐽(𝛾𝛾𝑏𝑏����⃗ , 𝜈𝜈) −
𝐽𝐽(𝛾𝛾𝑎𝑎���⃗ , 𝜈𝜈) > 𝐽𝐽(𝛾𝛾𝑐𝑐���⃗ , 𝜈𝜈) − 𝐽𝐽(𝛾𝛾𝑎𝑎���⃗ , 𝜈𝜈). 
Accordingly, an axiom of convex sensitivity of monotonicity demands vice versa: The 
smaller the relative distance of need and allotment is, the deeper is the impact of the 
change by the same absolute value. 
AXIOM 16 (CONVEX SENSITIVITY OF MONOTONICITY): If for a given 𝜈𝜈 a 𝛾𝛾𝑏𝑏����⃗  and 𝛾𝛾𝑐𝑐���⃗  are retrie-
ved from 𝛾𝛾𝑎𝑎���⃗  by having an i ∈ P in 𝛾𝛾𝑏𝑏����⃗  and a j ∈ P in 𝛾𝛾𝑐𝑐���⃗  with initially 
| νi − γi | < | νj − γj |, that are altered by the same δ with δ > 0 that is subtracted if i, j ∈ U 
and added by i, j ∈ O, then 𝐽𝐽(𝛾𝛾𝑏𝑏����⃗ , 𝜈𝜈) − 𝐽𝐽(𝛾𝛾𝑎𝑎���⃗ , 𝜈𝜈) ≷ 𝐽𝐽(𝛾𝛾𝑐𝑐���⃗ , 𝜈𝜈) − 𝐽𝐽(𝛾𝛾𝑎𝑎���⃗ , 𝜈𝜈), depending on the kind of 
monotonicity that is assumed: 
(1) if i, j ∈ U, then 𝐽𝐽(𝛾𝛾𝑏𝑏����⃗ , 𝜈𝜈) − 𝐽𝐽(𝛾𝛾𝑎𝑎���⃗ , 𝜈𝜈) > 𝐽𝐽(𝛾𝛾𝑐𝑐���⃗ , 𝜈𝜈) − 𝐽𝐽(𝛾𝛾𝑎𝑎���⃗ , 𝜈𝜈), 
(2) if invert monotonicity is assumed and i, j ∈ S ∪ O, then 𝐽𝐽(𝛾𝛾𝑏𝑏����⃗ , 𝜈𝜈) − 𝐽𝐽(𝛾𝛾𝑎𝑎���⃗ , 𝜈𝜈) > 𝐽𝐽(𝛾𝛾𝑐𝑐���⃗ , 𝜈𝜈) −
𝐽𝐽(𝛾𝛾𝑎𝑎���⃗ , 𝜈𝜈), 
(3) if continuously increasing monotonicity is assumed and i, j ∈ S ∪ O, then 𝐽𝐽(𝛾𝛾𝑏𝑏����⃗ , 𝜈𝜈) −
𝐽𝐽(𝛾𝛾𝑎𝑎���⃗ , 𝜈𝜈) < 𝐽𝐽(𝛾𝛾𝑐𝑐���⃗ , 𝜈𝜈) − 𝐽𝐽(𝛾𝛾𝑎𝑎���⃗ , 𝜈𝜈). 
Those sensitivities can also be visualised for the three kinds of monotonicity using the 
three dimensional model that has been applied above. It shows exemplarily the functional 
value or the justice value of J for all possible pairs of γi and νi from an individual i with γi = 
x and νi = y on an interval [−100, 100] with x, y ∈ Z and J = z. Depicted are exemplarily pos-
sible curve progressions for both concave and convex sensitivities for all three kinds of 
monotonicity. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4: Two and three dimensional visual examples for concave and convex sensitivities for all three kinds of monotonicity 
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2 Conclusion 
Based on these axioms a variety of subsequent research projects could be justified. Of 
course, the presented axioms do not exhaust the possible normative assumptions; and still 
every single one of them is debatable. For example, the presented axioms are not orien-
tated on aspects of procedural justice but focus on justice of outcome. In this regard an 
extension is conceivable, for example by including the criterion of Pareto efficiency. Mo-
reover, the axioms are meant to be understood within the frame of non-comparative jus-
tice: The evaluation of needs-based justice relies on the ratio of needs and allotments of 
the individual. It could be considered to extend or replace the axioms by other principles 
of justice in order to get a comparative perspective and thereby for example focus on the 
position of an individual compared to other members of a group. 
Moreover, the relation of the given axioms among themselves is interesting: Which axi-
oms are compatible with each other? Is there a plausible set of maximal consistent axi-
oms? Furthermore, it is obvious to ask how each axiom relates to concrete normative the-
ories, and it is also obvious to ask how they can be used to form a basis for depicting em-
pirical evaluations of justice. Can these axioms be useful for modelling the justice evalua-
tions of laymen (cf. Schokkaert, 1999)? 
Even though the axioms are formulated within the framework of needs-based justice, they 
are not limited to this very frame – at least not all of them. It is possible to transfer them 
to other ideals of justice. They also could be extended to more general metrics of justice 
with a plurality of concepts. 
Finally, it is possible to use a justified and consistent subset of the presented axioms to 
evaluate possible indices or to form a basis for modelling such indices. 
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